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NOTES AND COMMENT
Editor-JosEPHA. ScHIAVONE
LANDLORD'S LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PREMISES AFTER PASSAGE
OF TITLE.

It is only the common ways of leased premises that a landlord
must keep in repair for the protection of his tenants.1 But even
as to those so retained as common passageways a purchaser of real
property is tinder no duty to inspect before taking possession; 2
nor is the vendor under any obligation to examine after he has
transferred. 3 "One's liability in negligence for the condition of
land ceases when the premises pass out of one's control before injury results." 4
That such is the rule in this state may be implied from a study
of the decisions of the courts of New York involving the liability
of the landlord after the title has been transferred.5
It has been stated by way of dictum merely, that the vendee
is not responsible for the dangerous condition of the premises until
he has had notice thereof and a reasonable time within which to
repair.6
Thus there is a period after the transfer when the tenant of
the vendor is without remedy for injuries resulting from defective
conditions of the demised premises. This is due to the termination
of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the vendor and
the tenant, and the immunity of the vendee from liability for a reasonable period of time after notice of the defective condition of the
premises plus a reasonable time within which to repair.
'Dollard v. Roberts, 130 N. Y. 269, 29 N. E. 104 (1891); Peil v. Reinhart,
127 N. Y. 381, 27 N. E. 1077 (1891).
'Kilmer v. White, 254 N. Y. 64, 171 N. E. 908 (1930); Ahern v. Steele,
115 N. Y. 203, 22 N. E. 193 (1889).
'Trustees of Canandaigua v. Foster, 156 N. Y. 354, 359, 50 N. E. 971, 973
(1898); Wilks v. N. Y. Tel. Co., 243 N. Y. 351, 359, 153 N. E. 444, 446
(1926).
But see Jaffe v. Harteau, 56 N. Y. 398 (1874) ; Grobner v. Norton, 183
N. Y. Supp. 731 (4th Dept. 1920); Thompson, Real Property (1924) Sec.
1387.
See also American Law Institute, "Restatement of Torts," Tentative
Draft, No. 4, Sec. 222: "Except as stated in Sec. 223, a vendor is not subject
to liability for bodily harm caused to his vendee or others upon the land after
the vendee has taken possession, by any dangerous condition *** which existed at the time vendee took possession."
' Kilmer v. White, supra note 2 at 69, 171 N. E. at 909.
'Supra notes 2 and 3.
'Supra note 2.
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In June, 1930, the Court of Appeals reviewed the case of
Kilmer v. White,7 where the rule enunciated was squarely presented.
The defendant (White) had leased to the plaintiff (Kilmer) the
upper apartment of a three-story apartment house on April 20, 1926.
A porch in the rear adjoined the leasehold. It was not used by the
tenants in common but the landlord and workmen used it in connection with a scuttle in the ceiling of the piazza as a means of access
to the roof of the building. On October 28, 1927, the defendant
transferred the premises to one Rubin, by deed recorded the following day, and at which time Rubin, unknown to the plaintiff,
entered into possession. On October 31, 1927, plaintiff, while cleaning out the woodbox, leaned his arm against the railing of the porch.
The upper rail gave way, and, losing his balance, he fell to the
ground below, sustaining severe injuries. The evidence showed that
defendant had notice of the defective condition but that neither
plaintiff nor Rubin had discovered it.
The trial Justice dismissed the action as against Rubin, and
submitted to the jury the question as to the reservation of the piazza
by the landlord. The jury was instructed that, if the landlord had reserved it, he was bound to exercise due diligence in keeping the
railing in repair, and, so far as the tenants were concerned, notice
of change in possession and ownership was necessary to change
the nature of the 'tenancy. The jury returned a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff, which the Appellate Division (Third Department)
unanimously affirmed. 8 On appeal, held: The vendor is not liable
for dangerous conditions existing at the time of the transfer, unless, by concealing them, he prevents the purchaser from learning
of the defects. "The transfer of the reversion, whether with the
consent of the tenant or without it, is a transfer of the lease and
of its rights and obligations." 9
A landlord who neglects to keep premises in repair according
to his covenant, allowing such to become a nuisance, and later transfers while in that condition, is guilty of misfeasance and responsible
for the damage caused after title has passed.' 0 Likewise one who
leases premises to be used as a public amusement is under a duty
to repair on the theory that those who enter are there at the invitation of the lessee who maintains and the lessor who leased it for
that purpose. Liability is predicated not upon contract but upon
tort; the lessor having failed to make safe premises under his control.11 While these cases are not decisive of the present one, they
'Supra note 2.
'227 App. Div. 830, 238 N. Y. Supp. 862 (3rd Dept. 1930).

'Matter of O'Donnell, 240 N. Y. 99, 105, 147 N. E. 541, 543 (1925).
"0Klepper v. Seymour House Corp., 246 N. Y. 85, 158 N. E. 29 (1927);
McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N. Y. 340, 160 N. E. 391 (1928).
'Edwards v. N. Y. & H. R. R., 98 N. Y. 245 (1885) in which Earle, .
at p. 248 stated: "If any responsibility in this case attaches to the defendant,
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indicate the scope of the rule. Apparently the courts are loathe
to extend it.
The decision in the instant case propounds a rigid application
of this rule. If the plaintiff's injuries were sustained three months
after the transfer of the reversion there would be no thought of
holding the defendant liable. 12 If the premises were leased for a
public use, 13 or through negligence had become a nuisance, 14 the
defendant's liability would continue after the transfer. But where
injuries are sustained within a few days or a few hours after the
sale, the courts must grope in the shadowy realm of conflicting
rights. It is admitted that in the instant case the decision was the
result of the logical application of the rule; but would the conclusion of the Court have been the same had a wall of the building
collapsed, seriously injuring twenty of the tenants, which wall upon
inspection by the vendee before the transfer had shown no evidence
of the defect? 13 Or, since inspection by the vendee before the
transfer is not necessary, presume he made no attempt to determine
the condition of the premises.
Logical application of the rule would require a decision adverse
to the tenants.
Under present economic conditions large properties are being
transferred daily without the knowledge of the tenants, or sufficient
inspection by the vendee. The recurrence of the present problem
is inevitable. Should the vendor's liability be extended beyond its
present limits and continue during the reasonable time in which the
vendee is allowed to discover the defect and make the necessary
repairs? Or should the vendee upon taking possession be charged,
it cannot be based upon any contract obligation but must rest entirely in
delictum."
And in Junkermann v. Tilyou Realty Corp., 213 N. Y. 404, 108 N. E.
109 (1915), Cardozo, J .at p. 410, 108 N. E. at 110, declared: "In this situation, if there existed when he made his lease a dangerous condition that was
known to him, or by reason of inspection, might have been known, the law
charges him with liability."
'Uggla v. Brokaw, 117 App. Div. 596, 102 N. Y. Supp. 857 (1st Dept.
1907).
"Junkermann v. Tilyou Realty Corp., supra note 11.
"4 Supra note 10. For cases of continuing liability after transfer due to
collateral covenants see Jones v. Parker, 163 Mass. 564, 40 N. E. 1044 (1895) ;
Neal v. Jefferson, 212 Mass. 517, 99 N. E. 334 (1912); Ganz v. Clark, 252
N. Y. 92. 169 N. E. 100 (1929); Mauro v. Alvino, 90 Misc. 328, 152 N. Y.
Supp. 963 (1st Dept. 1915); Stuart v. Jay, 1 K. B. 362 (1904).
See (1926) 5 Tenn. L. Rev. 362, regarding the case of Smith v. Tucker,
151 Tenn. 347, 270 S.W. 66 (1925), wherein a few weeks after conveyance
defendant vendor assured the plaintiff that a cracked wall was not defective,
and promised to send a mason "right over," to repair the crack. The mason
did not come, and within a few days, the wall fell burying plaintiff's infant
son in the debris, and inflicting injuries from which he died, Held; in the
absence of fraud of the vendor who relinquished the premises tort liability
may not be imposed, since the defendant had no knowledge of the defect when
he transferred the premises.
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if not with actual knowledge, at least with presumptive notice of
the dangerous condition and the risk involved?
The problem is a social one. The increasing number of individuals affected demands a remedy. Undoubtedly the vendee's
liability will be extended until assumption of title will "ipso facto"
charge him with presumptive notice of the condition of the premises. While it has been suggested that the liability of the vendor
should continue until discovery and repair by the vendee 1 6 it is
submitted that the former rule would be more easily applied, since
the uncertain element of "reasonable time to repair" would not be
included. The line would be sharply drawn if determined by the
"time of transfer," and responsibility would be definitely fixed.
COYLE A. BoD.

THE

GENERATIVE FoRcE OF CUSTOM AND USAGE IN LAW.

There is an ancient rule of evidence of wide application that
parol testimony cannot be received to contradict, vary, add to or
subtract from the terms of a valid written instrument." It is but
a corollary of the rule, that where there is no imperfection or
ambiguity in the language of a contract, it will be deemed to express the entire and exact meaning of the parties. 2 Ergo, on the
same principle, all conversations and parol agreements prior to or
contemporaneous with the written agreement are so merged therein,
that they cannot be given in evidence for the purpose of changing
the contract or showing an intention or understanding different
from that expressed in the written agreement.3
The rigidity of the rule above adverted to has been relaxed to
allow for numerous exceptions, 4 the analysis and treatment of which
Kilmer v. White, supra note 2.
A written contract cannot be altered to show that an indorsement on a
note in blank was agreed to be without recourse, Martin v. Cole, 104 U. S.
30, 26 L. ed. 647 (1881); that the acceptor of a draft should not be called
on to pay, Davis v. Randall, 115 Mass. 547, 15 Am. Rep. 146 (1874) ; that the
date of payment be changed, Wells v. Baldwin, 18 Johns. 45 (N. Y. 1820);
Wright v. Taylor, 9 Wend. 538 (N. Y., 1832) ; that goods might be delivered
in parcels where the agreement was to deliver a gross amount, Baker v. Higgins, 21 N. Y. 397 (1860); that a certificate of deposit should bear interest,
Reed v. Bank of Attica, 124 N. Y. 671, 27 N. E. 250 (1891).
-'Miles v. Schreve, 179 Mich. 671, 146 N. W. 374 (1914); Reed v. Van
Ostrand. 1 Wend. 424 (N. Y. 1828); Washington Trust Co. v. Keyes, 79
Wash. 61, 139 Pac. 638 (1914).
'De Witt v. Berry, 134 U. S. 306. 10 Sup. Ct. 536 (1890); Beall v.
Fisher, 95 Cal. 568, 30 Pac. 773 (1892) ; Ennis v. Wright, 217 Mass. 40. 104 N.
E. 430 (1914) ; Thomas v. Scutt, 127 N. Y. 133, 27 N. E. 961 (1891) ; Traders
National Bank v. Laskin, 207 App. Div. 18, 201 N. Y. Supp. 728 (4th Dept.
1923); see editorial, N. Y. L. J., May 4, 1928.
'Richardson, Evidence (1928), Sec. 425.

